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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Neil Patterson contends that the district court erred by ruling on the substantive merits of
his claims for post-conviction relief before ruling on his request for appointment of post-
conviction counsel.  Thus, the district court failed to apply the standards set by the Idaho
Supreme Court, effectively weighing the credibility of Mr. Patterson’s claims against evidence
proffered by the State rather than, as the Idaho Supreme Court requires, considering those claims
in the light most favorable to him.
The State’s response bears the same flaw.  The State concedes that allegations that the
petitioner pled guilty based on trial counsel’s reckless promise about what sentence would follow
a guilty plea could present a meritorious claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  And yet, the
State still contends Mr. Patterson’s allegations to both those points does not present the
possibility  of  a  valid  claim  based  on  the  State’s  weighing  of  the  credibly  of  those  allegations
against the perceived credibility of other evidence in the record, a weighing which is improper in
the determination of whether to appoint counsel.
Since Mr. Patterson did allege the possibility of a valid claim, this Court should reverse
the district court’s erroneous order denying his request for appointment of post-conviction
counsel and remand this case for further proceedings.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr.  Patterson’s  Appellant’s  Brief.   They  need  not  be  repeated  in  this  Reply  Brief,  but  are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
2ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Patterson’s motion for
appointment of post-conviction counsel based on its consideration of the substantive merits of
his petition, rather than ruling on the motion for appointment of counsel first, as required by
Idaho Supreme Court precedent.
3ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Mr. Patterson’s Motion For Appointment
Of Post-Conviction Counsel Based On Its Consideration Of The Substantive Merits Of His
Petition, Rather Than Ruling On The Motion For Appointment Of Counsel First, As Required
By Idaho Supreme Court Precedent
The Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that that, “[b]y not specifically addressing the
appointment of counsel issue before dealing with the substantive issues of [the] Petition, the
district court abuses its discretion.” Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 793 (2004) (emphasis
added). The district court’s own words make it clear it did not follow that standard:  it “denied
the Petitioner’s request for the appointment of counsel because this Court determined the
Petitioners claims were without merit.”  (R., p.103 (emphasis added).)
Despite that, the State contends that was not error based on the idea that the district court
can consider the substantive merits of the claims alleged as part of its analysis on a motion for
appointment of post-conviction counsel.  (Resp. Br., p.9.)  The State is only partially correct.  It
is  true  that  a  ruling  on  a  request  for  counsel  necessarily  looks  at  the  nature  of  the  allegations
made in terms of whether they assert facts which would potentially show deficient performance
and prejudice.  See, e.g., Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793.  However, the State’s argument fails to
appreciate the fact that the Idaho Supreme Court has held that the standard of review for a
motion for appointment of counsel is different and distinct from standard of review for dismissal
on the substantive merits, meaning is it not proper to assess whether those allegations, as they
are, make out a meritorious claim as part of the determination regarding whether to appoint
counsel. Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 655 (2007).  Rather, at the appointment-of-counsel
stage,  the  district  court  is  only  supposed  to  evaluate  whether  there  is a possibility that the
allegations could be developed into viable claims; whether, with the assistance of counsel, the
4petitioner could present additional evidence to show that his allegations, in fact, have merit.
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793.
The flaw in the State’s argument is that a decision on the substantive merits of
Mr. Patterson’s allegations turns on a weighing of the credibility of those allegations.  Based on
the determination, the State’s argument goes, that Mr. Patterson’s allegations are not true when
compared against other evidence in the record, those claims have no merit, and therefore,
counsel should not be appointed.  (See generally Resp. Br.)  However, “[s]ummary judgment is
impermissible when there is a conflict in the evidence respecting material issues of fact or when
the evidence raises questions of the credibility of witnesses.” Land O’Lakes, Inc. v. Bray, 138
Idaho 817, 818-19 (Ct. App. 2003); see also Swader, 143 Idaho at 655 (indicating that the
standard for appointment of counsel is lower than the standard for summary dismissal).
By making his allegations in his notarized pleadings, Mr. Patterson is a witness in this
matter and those allegations are his testimony.1 See, e.g., Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 593
(Ct. App. 1993).  Therefore, assessing the credibility of those allegations in these initial
proceedings is improper.  Rather, only once an evidentiary hearing is held is the district court in
a position to properly weigh the evidence, make credibility determinations, and resolve factual
issues, just as it would do in any other civil court trial. See, e.g., Richman v. State, 138 Idaho
190, 192 (Ct. App. 2002); Larkin v. State, 115 Idaho 72, 73 (Ct. App. 1988).
1 As discussed in the Appellant’s Brief, to the extent the specific allegations of the relevant facts
were not articulated until Mr. Patterson’s attempt to respond to the motion for summary
dismissal, which was not notarized, that only demonstrates there were facts counsel could have
assisted him in properly alleging in support of his claim for relief.  (App. Br., pp.7-8.)  However,
that in and of itself demonstrates that counsel should have been appointed in this case.
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793 (explaining part of the reason for appointing post-conviction
counsel is to “give the petitioner an opportunity with counsel to properly allege the necessary
supporting facts”).
5The Third Circuit, using similar standards to those set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court,
has explained why an argument like the one the State has made here is flawed. See Zilich v.
Reid, 36 F.3d 317 (3rd Cir. 1994).   In Zilich, like here, the petitioner asserted that he had only
pled guilty because of his attorney’s promises about the sentence he would receive as a result.
Id. at 319 (specifically alleging that his attorney promised he would receive probation in
exchange for bribing the judge as a basis for federal habeas corpus relief).   The  Third  Circuit
explained:  “While Zilich’s responses to the questions posed by his attorney and the district
attorney during the [plea] colloquy appear to conclusively negate Zilich’s allegations in his
habeas petition, total reliance on the colloquy is misplaced under the circumstances posed by this
case.” Id. at 322.  Rather, despite those answers, “‘[t]he possibility exists that an inherent part of
the out-of-court understanding was that appellant would respond negatively to an open court
inquiry as to whether promises had been made.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Valenciano, 495
F.2d 585, 587 (3rd Cir. 1974)).  Because that possibility existed, summary dismissal was
improper because “‘the specific and detailed factual assertions of the petitioner, while
improbable, cannot at this juncture be said to be incredible.” Id. at 322-23.
Basically, the Third Circuit rejected the government’s argument because if the
petitioner’s allegations were true, they “would negate the voluntariness of his plea,” and so, “the
petitioner [would be] clearly entailed to relief.’” Id. at 321, 323 (quoting Machibroda v. United
States, 368 U.S. 487, 495 (1962)2).  Thus, under the proper standards, those “claims cannot be
2 The State would criticize Mr. Patterson’s reliance on Machibroda, arguing it does not apply as
Mr. Patterson cited it because Machibroda dealt with a promise made by a prosecutor, whereas
here, the promise was made by defense counsel.  (Resp. Br., p.10.)  However, Mr. Patterson cited
Machibroda directly in order to identify the source of the quotation he was using, which
identified the appropriate remedy.  (App. Br., p.7; see THE BLUEBOOK:  A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF
CITATION R. 1.2(a), at 46 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds., 18th ed. 2005) (identifying
several  different  situations  where  “[no  signal]”  is  appropriate).)   The  succinct  summary  of  the
6resolved without a fact finder determining credibility,” meaning an evidentiary hearing was
needed, after which the district court could make the appropriate credibility determinations. Id.
at 321, 323.
The Idaho Supreme Court explained how those standards affect the decision to appoint
counsel in Swader, holding that, even though “[t]he investigation by counsel may not produce
sufficient evidence to survive a motion to dismiss,” counsel should still be appointed on the
possibility that counsel might be  able  to  help  the  petitioner  flesh  out  his  claims. Swader, 143
Idaho at 655.  As such, applying the proper standards, despite his statements in the plea
questionnaire, if Mr. Patterson’s allegations are viewed in the light most favorable to him (i.e.,
considered as if they are, in fact, true), he, like Mr. Zilich, would be entitled to relief based on
those allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel because even though they might be
rule he was applying to reach that remedy was quoted in the subsequent parenthetical citation to
Wellnitz v. Page, 420 F.2d 935, 937 (10th Cir. 1970).  (App. Br., p.7.)
In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court has referred to Machibroda in a similar manner, directly
citing it, among others, for the broad rule that a plea can be attacked in state habeas corpus if it
“is induced by some form of deception or threat by officers of the state or government,” not just
prosecutors, and applied that rule to a claim that defense counsel promised a particular sentence.
King v. State, 93 Idaho 87, 91 n.4 (1969), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in
State v. Wood, 125 Idaho 911, 913 (1993); see also Zilich, 36 F.3d at 322-23 (quoting
Machibroda in the same manner as the Appellant’s Brief in regard to a claim that trial counsel
promised a particular sentence)).  The King Court’s statement of the rule echoes a point made by
Justice McFadden in his dissent in Davidson v. State:
Had the instant petition contained an allegation that appellant’s appointed counsel
told him that an arrangement had been worked out with the prosecution or the
court that a lesser sentence would be imposed, which arrangement was not
fulfilled, under the following cases an evidentiary hearing would have been
required to determine whether the plea of guilty had been voluntarily entered.
Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 48[7], 487, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473
(1962); . . . .
Davidson v. State, 92 Idaho 104, 107 (1968) (McFadden, J., dissenting).  Thus, the State’s
criticism is not well-founded.
7improbable, they cannot yet be said to be incredible. See, e.g., Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793;
Land O’Lakes, 138 Idaho at 818-19.
The Idaho Supreme Court actually demonstrated this is the proper analysis in King.
There, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that the petitioner had been trying, without the assistance
of an attorney, to corroborate his allegations that trial counsel had induced his guilty plea through
improper promises, but had met significant hurdles in that regard. King, 93 Idaho at 91-92.
Despite the lack of corroborating evidence, the King Court still remanded the case specifically
for an evidentiary hearing under the post-conviction statutes, noting the possibility that, if the
petitioner’s allegations were true, his plea was constitutionally defective. See id. at 92.
Mr. Patterson’s claims presented the same possibility of a valid claim as the allegations in King,
and  so,  he  should  have,  at  least,  been  appointed  post-conviction  counsel  to  assist  him  in
developing those claims.
In fact, the State has effectively conceded Mr. Patterson’s allegations present the
possibility of a valid claim, as it admitted:  “it is beyond cavil that recklessly promising his client
that a specific sentence will follow upon a plea can constitute deficient performance, and that
waiving a trial the defendant would have insisted on but for the reckless promise can be
prejudice.”  (Resp. Br., p.10.)  Thus, the fact that the district court ultimately had no control over
which rider program to which Mr. Patterson would be assigned demonstrates that trial counsel’s
alleged promise – that Mr. Patterson would be  placed  in  the  CAPP  program  –  was  a  reckless
promise, and thus, constituted deficient performance regardless of whether the district court later
made statements contradicting that promise. See, e.g., Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 166-67
(2014).
8Additionally, while good faith advice as to the likely outcome at sentencing, without
more, is not sufficient to establish a valid claim, see Davidson, 92 Idaho at 105-06, appointing
counsel would have allowed Mr. Patterson the opportunity to identify and allege additional facts
to show trial counsel’s promise was not simply good faith advice. See, e.g., Charboneau, 140
Idaho at 793 (reiterating that a pro se petitioner may not allege certain facts simply because he
does not know he needs to do so to make out his claim, and explaining that part of the reason for
appointing counsel is to “give the petitioner an opportunity with counsel to properly allege the
necessary supporting facts”).  Mr. Patterson’s allegations still present the possibility of a valid
claim, and so, should have been appointed. See Swader, 143 Idaho at 655 (explaining that
whether or not the court believes counsel would actually be successful in that regard is not the
appropriate question to ask).
 The State attempts to avoid the ramifications of its concession by pointing to a statement
in the Court of Appeals’ decision in Grant v. State, where the Court of Appeals stated that a
claim of ineffective assistance could be disproved by answers on a guilty plea advisory.  (See
Resp. Br., p.13.)  However, the State omits the footnote attached to that statement, in which the
Court of Appeals explained why it had reached that particular conclusion.  (See generally Resp.
Br., p.13.)  Specifically, the Grant Court explained:  “The guilty plea advisory forms are not part
of the record on appeal. . . . In the absence of an adequate record on appeal to support the
appellant’s claims, we will not presume error.  Rather, the missing portions of the record must be
presumed to support the actions of the trial court.” Grant v. State, 156 Idaho 598, 605 n.5 (Ct.
App. 2014).
Considering the Grant Court’s explanation of its decision, rather than looking at its
statement in a vacuum, it becomes clear that the Grant Court’s rationale does not apply to
9Mr. Patterson’s case.  Mr. Patterson’s guilty plea advisory form is part of the appellate record.
(See Order Granting Judicial Notice, dated August 21, 2017.)  As a result, there is no basis to
apply the presumption the Grant Court did.  Rather, this record presents conflicting evidence
which  demands  a  weighing  of  credibility.   Weighing  of  credibility,  as  discussed supra,  is  not
appropriate in deciding whether or not to grant a motion for appointment of post-conviction
counsel. See, e.g., Land O’Lakes, 138 Idaho at 818-19.
Therefore, Mr. Patterson’s allegation that he pled guilty because of trial counsel’s
promise about the sentence he would receive upon pleading guilty presents the possibility of
what the State concedes would be a valid claim.  As such, this Court should reverse the district
court’s decision to deny his motion for appointment of counsel since, under the standards set
forth by the Idaho Supreme Court, the district court should have appointed counsel based on his
presentation of the possibility of a valid claim, rather than jumping straight to an evaluation of
the substantive merits of Mr. Patterson’s claims.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Patterson respectfully requests this Court vacate the judgment dismissing his petition
and remand this case for further proceedings after post-conviction counsel is appointed to
represent him.
DATED this 5th day of October, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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